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A B S T R A C T
Expeditionary units operate beyond the normal supply chain. We examine a situation in which expeditionary
units are dispersed and moving forward to achieve some mission objective. The logistics decision must be made:
should resources (fuel) be shared between those expeditionary units. Our criterion is mission risk, or the
probability the expeditionary mission succeeds. Mission risk is modeled as a function of both logistics risk and
operational risk. We present a model of fuel sharing which incorporates this balance of risks and we demonstrate
the effectiveness of fuel sharing in an extended numerical example, based on historical data from the Ardennes
campaign in WWII.
1. Introduction
Expeditions are operations conducted away from a home base on
foreign soil, sea or space. Expeditions may be scientific, military or
commercial, but they always have a mission, a primary criterion against
which their success is measured. This paper will investigate expedi-
tionary logistics decisions, in terms of their impact on mission risk.
What makes expeditions unique from a logistical point of view is
that they are conducted beyond the range of normal supply chains, and
sometimes beyond the range of the normal chain-of-command. A key
dimension separating one type of expedition from another is its degree
of isolation. Perhaps the most interesting expeditions are conducted
entirely beyond the range of the supply chain. Such expeditions are not
common but include some well-known and important examples: space
exploration, military operations behind enemy lines, mountain-
climbing expeditions, and the geographical explorations that mapped
the globe between the fifteenth and early twentieth century.
Although the model developed here can be extended to scientific
and geographic expeditions, we focus on modeling military expeditions.
Many expeditionary missions face environmental hostility as an ob-
stacle in achieving their objectives (Cannon & Peterson, 2004; Hooker,
2011; Barnes & Cothren, 2012). However, for military expeditions we
must model this hostility as an active force, with intelligent encounters
and stochastic capabilities.
Of course, initial provisioning is essential in such expeditions, and it
may seem that initial provisioning is the only logistics decision for such
expeditions, since they are conducted beyond resupply. But this study
focuses on a post-supply-chain logistics decision made during isolated
expeditionary operations: the degree of resource sharing among ex-
peditionary units.
The significance of post-supply-chain logistics for the success of
isolated military expeditions is easy to demonstrate. Two well-known
examples from pre-modern warfare can be used to make this point:
Napoleon’s 1812 expedition into Russia; and Sherman’s 1864 march
through Georgia and South Carolina. These examples show how dif-
ferently logistics can impact the success or failure of an isolated military
expedition. Napoleon’s army started with an initial provisioning in-
sufficient for a campaign on Moscow, or a Russian winter. Unable to
supply themselves in the field, or re-provision in Moscow, the retreat
resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties, with far more deaths
from starvation, disease and exposure than from battle (Ségur, 1825,
Walter, 1991, van Creveld, 2004). Sherman, on the other hand, suc-
cessfully marched through Georgia and then through South Carolina,
not only provisioning his army, but building corduroy roads through
the swamp and achieving an average rate of advance of over 10 miles
per day across a hostile territory and a hostile environment (Foote,
2000; McPherson, 2003).
A more modern example of an isolated military expedition is the
German Ardennes Campaign in 1944. On December 16, 1944 the
Germans launched their last major offensive on the western front. Their
operational objective was to destroy or disable the port facilities at
Antwerp, but they were unable to provide the expedition with sufficient
fuel to reach that objective: fuel would need to be captured from the
Allies. In the event, two things stopped the German advance: a heroic
defense by outnumbered and surprised US forces on the northern and
southern flanks of the attack, and the German logistics disorganization
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and lack of fuel in the center (Dupuy, Bongard, & Anderson, 1994). In
this paper, we will use data from the Ardennes Campaign as a proof-of-
concept for our model of resource sharing.
In particular, we will look at fuel as a shared resource used to fa-
cilitate forward movement in combat. Other logistics resources might
be shared: other types of supply, maintenance assets and personnel, or
transportation assets and personnel. We will focus on fuel, for simpli-
city.
Fuel sharing is a logistics decision that should be made jointly with
an operational decision: whether to concentrate forces, or break into
several units, each striving to achieve an objective. In a military con-
text, such separation is common in search-and-rescue, search-and-de-
stroy or screening operations (Koopman, 1999). Modern swarming
tactics involve a separation-then-convergence of operations as well. All
of these operational strategies could be supported by fuel sharing, po-
tentially improving the chance of mission success.
Expeditionary units sharing resources is a controversial idea.
Deployed units increase their own risk, however slightly, by sharing
resources with another unit. However, their increased individual risk
may create a greater probability of success for the overall mission. The
sharing itself – the transshipment – may also involve risk. But modern
technologies (e.g., the use of autonomous vehicles for resupply) can
reduce that risk.
In the military, the planning hierarchy is strategic-operational-tac-
tical (note the difference from commercial sector planning, where op-
erational planning is the lowest level). Logistics may be seen as a
constraint to operational planning, while logistics planning may simply
take its objectives and requirements from operational plans. That the
two should be planned jointly, with logistics capabilities informing
operational plans is, at least historically, relatively rare. Tactical lo-
gistics decisions, such as the ones modelled in this paper, are sometimes
left to field commanders.
In short, this paper develops a model of fuel sharing between ex-
peditionary units, and uses a historical case to demonstrate the poten-
tial value of that model. In the Industrial Engineering literature, this
kind of fuel sharing is most closely related to the literature on trans-
shipments between retail operations, which are known to reduce the
risk of stock outs (that literature is briefly reviewed in the next section).
The contribution of the paper is (1) A model and solution algorithm that
examines the way logistics (stock out) risk and environmental (combat)
risk jointly impact mission risk, and (2) the presentation of an extended
historical case example that demonstrates the potential value of the fuel
sharing in isolated expeditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
review background literature. In Section 3 we develop a joint logistics-
combat model and a simulation-based solution approach. In Section 4,
we provide a numerical example based on historical data to demon-
strate the utility of incorporating logistics planning in post‐supply chain
military operations. In the final section we provide a summary and
conclusions.
2. Background
This section briefly reviews the context and background necessary
to understand the development and intent of the model presented in
this paper.
2.1. Risk in public sector logistics
In the model we present in Section 3, the minimization of mission
risk is the objective of logistics decision making.
Logistics in a not‐for-profit environment serves the organization by
facilitating its mission. Resources in this environment are budgeted and
pre-allocated between competing activities to facilitate the accom-
plishment of a mission. In such an environment, the paradigms of
maximizing profit or minimizing cost are difficult to adapt as a guide
for action. The benefits obtained by accomplishing a mission can rarely
be measured entirely in dollar terms or in the expenditure of resources
(cost). Exceeding an allocation may be fatal to a mission, while sur-
pluses may not be useful. Hence, the difference between benefit and
cost is not only difficult to measure, it may be misleading as a perfor-
mance metric (Doerr, Lewis & Eaton, 2005).
Public sector managers have been noted for exhibiting excessive risk
aversion (Meier, Gill & Waller, 2000), and researchers have re-
commended the explicit measurement of outcome risk as a performance
measure, to make the ‘cost of being wrong’ endogenous to the decision
process (Gill & Meier, 2000). Doerr and Kang (2014) have argued that,
in public sector logistics, the primary performance metrics should be the
risk of exceeding allocated resources, balanced against the risk to
mission objectives. Those authors call this a stewardship perspective, and
it is the perspective we will take in this paper. The effectiveness of a
logistics policy meant to reduce the risk that transportation resources
(fuel) will be exhausted will be assessed by measuring the reduction in
mission risk attained by that policy.
2.2. Logistics in combat models
With a few exceptions, such as humanitarian logistics, virtually all
military logistics research is done in support of combat (Fish 1987;
Boensel, & Schrady, 2004; Bertulis & Miller, 2005; Lenhardt, 2006). The
integration of logistics and combat that we examine in this paper is
different for two reasons. First, we examine a logistics decision that
must be made beyond the reach of the supply chain. The majority of
logistics research, even on expeditionary logistics, deals with supply
chain decisions. Second, we are dealing with a logistics activity that
occurs during combat operations, that may impact the success of those
operations, and whose success must be measured in terms of those
operations. The majority of logistics research, even on expeditionary
logistics, uses non-combat measures of effectiveness such as material
availability or lead time. Because we judge the success of our logistics
decisions on the basis of how those decisions contribute to combat
outcomes, we must incorporate a model of combat.
Combat models usually pit a ‘blue’ army against a ‘red’ army.
Conventionally, the ‘blue’ force is the one the modeler is concerned
with, and the ‘red’ forces represent an enemy combatant. (This red/blue
convention started in the 19th century, and is not an artifact of the cold
war.) The heart of most modern combat models is the Lanchester
model, a set of differential equations that usually takes at least four
parameters:
B(0)= the number of ‘blue’ combatants at time 0, the beginning of
conflict
R(0)= the number of ‘red’ or enemy combatants at time 0
β=the ‘red kills blue’ rate
γ=the ‘blue kills red’ rate
Perhaps the simplest form of the combat model is:
dB(t)/dt=−βR(t),
dR(t)/dt=−γB(t).
Many extensions of this model have been developed to account for
e.g., differences in mobility, armaments, and the inherent randomness
of battle. To our knowledge however, only two extensions of Lanchester
modeling have incorporated a logistics factor (Maybee, 1981;
Langhauser, 1987), and neither of those examined fuel sharing, or used
mission risk as criteria. The dearth of integrative models is informative
and supports our earlier contention that combat and logistics are not
typically treated as a joint concern. We also do not attempt to extend
the Lanchester equations to account for logistics resource sharing. In-
stead, we develop a model of fuel sharing that embeds a stochastic si-
mulation model of combat (based on the Lanchester parameters
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estimated in the literature), when the simulation indicates that combat
should occur. Logistics resources (fuel) as well as reductions in fighting
strength are determined by the outcome of the combat, as the victor
will obtain a random amount of fuel from the losing side.
2.3. Expeditionary logistics
The rate of forward movement and the availability of supplies, in-
cluding fuel, are two primary responsibilities of logistics in expedi-
tionary operations.
2.3.1. Fuel sharing transshipments in expeditions
Risk pooling is the primary logic behind transshipments (Reyes &
Meade, 2006). Risk pooling is appealing in the commercial sector be-
cause it can reduce cost, or reduce risk at the same cost. In addition to
those benefits, risk pooling is appealing in military contexts because it
can enhance agility and reduce the size of the logistics footprint which
must accompany forward-deployed (retail) units. Part of the answer to
this is technology: in portable generation of water and power (Simon,
Apte, & Regnier, 2017). But part of the answer is also in re-thinking the
tactics of logistics in the field. For example, forward deployed mobile
units in the Afghan mountains reported greater mobility, and a greater
ability to sustain operations when they embedded maintenance per-
sonnel (Love, 2004). The Israeli Defense Force has worked to develop
maneuver-accompanying logistics (or “tucked up resupply”) to facil-
itate force agility; and the US Army has investigated ways to facilitate
rapid aggregation and disaggregation of forces along with the logistics
needed to support dispersed forces on a non‐contiguous battlefield
(Hall, 2015).
Typically, transshipments are modeled as providing a potential
benefit by reducing stock‐out risk, while incurring additional trans-
portation cost. Stock-out risks must be assessed at both the sending and
receiving unit, and transshipment is only prescribed if the value of the
incremental reduction in stock-out risk at the receiving unit exceeds the
sum of the transportation expense, and the value of the incremental
increase of stock‐out risk at the sending unit (Oswald, 2013).
Transshipments in hostile environments or between expeditionary
units have not, to our knowledge, been examined. Emergency trans-
shipments in which time is critical have received some attention (Evers,
1997; Zhang, Liu, Jiang, Fan, & Song, 2016), though these models also
essentially involve expanding the supply chain to accommodate some
emergency need. Preventive sharing, intended to maintain a balance of
risk between units has been examined in secure environments (Li, Sun
& Gao, 2013; Lee, Jung & Jeon, 2007), and might be efficacious if the
risk of transshipment failure or interdiction could be controlled.
In the future, field infrastructure might make the sort of transship-
ments we examine simpler and safer. The military is evolving its con-
cept of expeditionary logistics to make better use of Expeditionary
Advanced Bases (EABs) that can be “rapidly established and dis-
established” to “support distribution of logistics across a large geo-
graphic area” (Neller, 2016, p. 23). Given EABs, sophisticated resource
allocation schemes such as cross-docking (Cota, Gimenez, Araujo,
Nogueira, deSouza & Ravetti, 2016) and Multi-hopping (Teubner &
Flath, 2015) would become possible, making the fuel sharing trans-
shipments we describe in this paper even more efficient and effective.
Positive correlation in demand between units, of course, reduces the
value, while negative correlation in demand increases the value of
transshipments. Hence, transshipments, and resource interdependence
are most valuable in situations where an increased need of one forward
deployed unit occurs at the time when the need by another forward
deployed unit decreases. We show in our numerical example that this is
the case when encountering an enemy along a large front: the enemy’s
relative strength in some sector is associated with a relative weakness in
another.
2.3.2. Forward movement in expeditions
The seminal work examining the rate of forward movement in battle
spaces is that of (Helmbold, 1995). Although Helmbold did not examine
the impact of resource sharing on forward movement, his work does
capture the difference in movement rates when forces are heavily en-
gaged or lightly engaged, and hence, we use his work to infer the time
required to travel under various combat conditions.
The rate of forward movement in combat is not a simple function of
the transportation equipment used. An examination of Helmbold’s
(1995) data shows that mechanization increased the forward rate of
movement in a battle area very little above that which was historically
achieved by cavalry. In a battle space, many factors interact to de-
termine the rate of forward movement, and the inherent potential of
transportation equipment may not be the most important. The way
transportation resources are allocated certainly makes a difference.
Chris Paparone (1995; 2000) has measured the results of this phe-
nomenon in detail across military encounters from the 18th century
through the 1990s, and found that the ratio of movement-rate achieved
to the inherent potential of transport equipment (what he calls the
‘friction index’) varies from 0.45 to 0.97 – a factor of two. He argues
persuasively that this variability can be controlled, and the rate of
movement increased, by good logistics planning.
3. Model
We examine a case in which multiple expeditionary units are
moving forward at stochastic rates toward an objective. Combat early in
the expedition affects the probability of later success, and also affects
the ability of units to support each other via transshipment. The pro-
blem is clearly stochastic, but it is also combinatorial and non-sta-
tionary. This limits our ability to solve the model with a closed form or
analytical approach: we are forced to resort to a numerical enumerative
algorithm. We will model a particular kind of mission (a penetration of
enemy territory to reach and destroy an objective) primarily for clarity
(this is the kind of mission for which we have data) and simplicity.
Other sorts of expeditionary missions are more complex to model (e.g.,
search and destroy), and certainly, a more general model of expedi-
tions, flexible enough to cover several types of mission could be built.
But our main objective is to build a compelling case for the importance
of considering fuel sharing in expeditions to reduce mission risk. In our
opinion, a simpler, rather than a more general model better makes this
point.
3.1. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
1. Combat can be accurately modeled with a set of Lanchester equa-
tions, the parameters of which are known. The initial positions,
sizes, armaments and movement rates of blue and red forces are
known.
2. Units from blue forces have a single objective, to reach a geographic
point by a given time, and destroy a facility there.
3. The minimum unit size needed to accomplish the mission is known.
If a unit falls below this size due to combat it is considered disabled
and does not continue to move forward.
4. At least two routes from the initial position of the blue forces to the
objective exist. All routes, the distance along the routes to the ob-
jective is known.
5. The rate of forward movement is random, with a known distribu-
tion.
6. Initial supply levels are known. For simplicity, we assume a single
supply commodity (fuel).
7. The probability of successful transshipment between each pair of
routes is known.
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3.2. Notation
T deadline to reach objective (and succeed)
m minimum force size needed to accomplish the mission
R number of routes available
r index defining a route, r R1,=
g index defining a unit, g G R1,=
G number of blue force units
r( )g binary variable indicating the route used by unit g.
r r( , )' indicates a transshipment is made from route r to r'
d t( )g distance remaining for unit g to reach objective at timet
s t( )g rate of forward movement of unit g at time t , a random
variable
q t( )g quantity of fuel supply remaining for unit g at timet
B t( )g number of ‘blue’ or friendly combatants in unit g at timet
R t( )g number of ‘red’ or hostile combatants encountered by unit g
at timet
c t( ) fuel consumption rate of unit g at timet
gr ‘red kills blue’ rate for the forces encountered by unit g on
router
gr ‘blue kills red’ rate for the forces encountered by unit g on
router
P g r( , ) probability unit g has mission success along route r
The objective function is
P g rmaxmax ( , )
G g, ,
That is, we seek to maximize the maximum the maximum prob-
ability that one unit will complete the mission, over a decision space
involving the number of units to send, the routes to send them along,
and which transshipments to make. Clearly the state space is potentially
enormous. However, in practical situations G would be a small number
and R is bound by the alternative routes available, typically small for
ground forces.
Any unit needs to satisfy the following constraints to complete the
mission:






where r ' is the route used by unit g
s t dt dDistance: ( ) (0)
T
g g0
B T mSurvival: ( )g
We also constrain each unit to travel along a single route, for sim-
plicity:
rUnit Route: ( ) 1
r g
=
Of course, this problem is neither linear, nor convex, nor even sta-
tionary. To solve it, we constructed a simulation to evaluate each po-
tential solution, and an enumerative algorithm to compare solutions.
3.3. Algorithm
The algorithm proceeds by explicit enumeration to examine each
feasible solution. Fortunately, as mentioned above, for practical pro-
blems the feasible region is small; and determining the objective
function value for each feasible solution can be done quite rapidly with
a simple simulation. The high-level pseudo-code for the simulation is
presented below. An explanation of how transshipments will be mod-
eled and how the Lanchester model is implemented for the case ex-
ample will be explained in Section 4.
1. For each assignment of units to routes iterate the following i times to
estimate the probability of success of this assignment
2. Set t 0=
3. While an active unit exists
a. for each active unit• calculate the time elapsed until next event (combat or desti-
nation reached) and distance travelled at the speed s t( )g .• Select the unit which will face the next event. Update time t, to
the time of this event, and distance and fuel, d t q t( )and ( )g g for
all units.• If t≥ T, record this iteration as a loss, and iterate i.• Else if d t( ) 0g = for some unit, and t T record this iteration as
a victory and iterate i.• Else if t T calculate the outcome of the combat encounter via
simulation based on Lanchester parameters. Update B t( )g for
the unit in combat. If loss, set unit inactive/disabled.
b. Examine each unit to see if they are an appropriate source for
transshipment at this point. If they are, determine the amount to
ship, and the best unit to receive the transshipment. Update fuel
for the sending unit and (after an appropriate time delay) the
receiving unit. (This is further explained below.)
4. Calculate the average probability of success for each unit across i
iterations. The probability of success for this assignment is the
highest such average achieved by any unit. If the probability of
success in this assignment is the highest encountered so far, store it
as the (temporary) best solution. Return to step 1 if any assignments
remain.
We have not specified precise transshipment rules in step 3b, be-
cause what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ source or the ‘best’ receiving
unit is highly context dependent. In general, transshipment routes,
amounts and unit-pairs should be selected to maximize the probability
that any one unit will reach the objective (so, units with less might
supply units that already have more). We will specify a precise set of
rules for the case example in the next section.
The run length i should be selected to provide the desired stability in
P g r( , ), based on the confidence interval. If there is a concern about
alternative optima, all solutions within the confidence interval of the
optimum might be retained for further testing with a greater run size.
The model and algorithm we have presented is more general than
what is needed for the case example in the next section. The case ex-
ample is based on a historical expedition, and many of the decisions the
model has been developed to solve (number of units, routes) will be
based upon that history, rather than this algorithm. We think this is
appropriate, because this will allow us to focus on the primary concern
of this paper, the decision to transship fuel. But the reader should not
expect the example in the next section to fully test the model we have
just presented.
4. Numerical case example
Rather than examining a large, but hypothetical test-bed of pro-
blems with our model (a typical numerical analysis), we will use a case-
based methodology to demonstrate it. We think this is an appropriate
method for our research, especially because the idea of fuel sharing is
controversial. In short, we think it is important to demonstrate first that
the idea can work, before engaging in analysis of hypothetical boundary
cases to establish when it can work. As the reader will see, simply de-
veloping a realistic case example for proof-of-concept is a significant
undertaking in itself.
We have selected the Ardennes Campaign, a well‐known large-scale
historical campaign to calibrate our model. The primary advantage of
this choice is the availability of data, and broad consensus on the
probable outcomes. Although the model presented in this paper is in-
tended to inform small‐unit (company or even platoon level) expedi-
tionary logistics, the required data are not available for small-scale
historical operations, and the data are classified for recent small‐scale
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operations.
There is some disagreement among historians about what Hitler was
trying to accomplish in the Ardennes Campaign. While there is broad
agreement that the strategic goal (peace on the Western Front) was
unrealistic, the immediate operational objective might not have been
unrealistic. Some historians propose that the Hitler’s operational ob-
jective was to take and hold Antwerp, not merely to destroy or disable
the port. We argue that such an objective was also unrealistic given the
Germans’ lack of supplies (especially fuel) and the Allied reinforce-
ments already available on the continent, as German generals in charge
of the operation clearly understood (MacDonald, 1985).
However, disabling the port facilities would have been feasible, and
would have significantly slowed the allies advance on the Western
Front. Hitler expected that a US defeat in Antwerp would raise existing
tensions between Allied commands. German goals of delaying the
Allied advance and sowing dissension between the Allied nations could
have been realized merely by destroying, or seriously disabling the port
facilities, even if they were unable to hold them. In support of all this,
the mission objective in our model is the destruction of the port at
Antwerp, a significant part of allied landing capacity.
4.1. Ardennes campaign, December 16–23, 1944
The Ardennes Campaign has been thoroughly researched, and that
research is widely available. Readers wishing a more complete under-
standing of the campaign, and models of the campaign, are re-
commended to read Cole (1965), MacDonald (1985), Dupuy, et al.
(1994), Bracken (1995), Bauman (1997), Fricker (1998), and Cavanagh
(2001). However, since many readers may not be familiar with this
history, it will be quickly outlined in this subsection.
The Ardennes Campaign involved an attack by (from north to south)
the German Sixth Panzer, Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies against the
U.S. Ninth and First Armies. The front stretched over the entire Belgian
border: from Aachen in the north into Luxembourg in the south. See
Map.
The Germans intended units of the Sixth Panzer Army to reach the
primary objective of Antwerp: this army was seen as the most capable,
and it was positioned closest to the objective. The Fifth Panzer and
Seventh Armies along the southern flank were intended to strike a
crippling blow against the U.S. First Army and prevent it (and the US
3rd Army, deployed further to the south in France) from interfering
with the advance of the Sixth Panzer Army. If possible, the Fifth Panzer
Army was to establish a defensive line to the south stretching from the
Rhine to the sea just south of Antwerp; this would have split the U.S.
forces in the south from British and Canadian forces in the north.
The immediate objective of the Sixth Panzer Army was to have ar-
mored units (the 1st and the 12th SS Panzer Divisions) reach the Meuse
River, about 1/3 of the way to Antwerp, within 24 h. The Fifth Panzer
army (9th SS and 116th Panzer Divisions) were to reach the Meuse
within 4 days securing a line of defense for the Sixth Panzer army
against reinforcement from the south. The Germans knew that speed
was essential, but they probably underestimated the depth of Allied
reserves already on the continent, and they certainly underestimated
the ability of the U.S. forces to delay their advance.
At the start of the campaign on December 16, the Germans brought
200,000 men, 600 armored combat vehicles and 1600 artillery pieces
against a U.S. force consisting of 80,000 men, 400 armored combat
vehicles and 400 artillery pieces (Dupuy, et al., 1994). But by December
24, the U.S. force had grown to over 600,000 men, 1200 armored
combat vehicles, and 3000 artillery pieces. With clear skies, allied
bombing of German positions also started on December 24. In hind-
sight, it is obvious that any chance the Germans had to destroy the
Antwerp port facilities disappeared along with their cloud cover on
December 24. Knowing all this in hindsight, in our simulation, we set a
deadline of December 24 for German forces to reach Antwerp, and
assume the campaign will fail if it is not complete by that date.
In light of actual events, this deadline seems unrealistic. In the ac-
tual campaign, no division of the Sixth Panzer army ever even reached
the Meuse: an unexpectedly strong defense by badly outnumbered U.S.
Forces blocked the Panzer attack on the northern shoulder until re-
inforcements could arrive. The farthest advance by German forces oc-
curred in the center, when the U.S. defenses in the Schnee Eifel were
overrun, allowing elements of the Fifth Panzer army to break through.
Those Fifth Panzer Army units reached the Meuse on the evening of
December 23, three days behind schedule, where they ran out of fuel.
It has been claimed that German military leadership in the field had
abandoned the goal of reaching Antwerp already by December 19th,
and instead began to concentrate on consolidating a defensible line at
the Meuse, and the envelopment of US forces east of the river: the
so‐called Small Solution (MacDonald, 1985). Clearly, the actions of the
1st SS Panzer Corps, which engaged in needless, time-consuming and
well-documented atrocities (Cavanagh, 2004), seem more consistent
with the Small Solution (or collective retribution) than a dedication to
the original objective. But in hindsight, the Small Solution proved no
more tenable than Hitler’s original plan. The result of the Ardennes
Campaign was the destruction of any remaining German offensive
capability: about 50,000 Germans were captured, killed or wounded,
equivalent to more than 3 divisions. The Germans were never able to
mount another offensive on the Western front.
We assume that German divisions remain solely dedicated to the
original objective of destroying the port facility at Antwerp, and we
model their actions as consistent with that goal, at least until December
24. This assumption entails at least two significant counterfactuals
(things that did not happen in the historical event): (1) the 9th SS
Panzer Division, and the 116th Panzer division remain focused on the
goal of reaching Antwerp, and do not become entangled or distracted
by events on the Southern shoulder (i.e., Bastogne), at least until
December 24. This counterfactual is consistent with the German com-
mand understanding (if not Hitler’s) that they will be unable to hold the
territory they gain, and so, concentrating on the mission objective in-
stead. (2) The 9th SS Panzer Division is held in reserve for only 1 day,
merely to select the best route to Antwerp based on initial day battles;
they are not used to shore up weak places in the assault, but instead
they select the route that seems most likely to allow them to reach
Antwerp. Because of this, they first engage US Forces on December 19,
rather than December 20, and if victorious, they can sometimes reach
Antwerp. We investigate the sensitivity of the results to these coun-
terfactuals when we present status quo results later in the paper (that is,
results when these two events happen as they did historically, rather
than as we model them).
The Germans started the Ardennes campaign with less than½ of the
fuel they estimated would be required to reach Antwerp and planned to
use captured fuel to reach their objectives (Cole, 1965, pp. 665–667).
The delays encountered on the northern shoulder of the campaign were
problematic not only because they allowed reinforcements to come into
play, but also because they allowed the Allies to destroy fuel depots
before the Germans could reach them. Importantly, a major fuel depot
on the Spa‐Stavelot road containing several hundred thousands of gal-
lons of fuel was destroyed just hours before it was reached by the 1st SS
Panzer division. Later estimates indicate that the destroyed fuel would
have allowed 2 Panzer divisions to reach Antwerp. We use a stochastic
combat model in which this fuel depot may or may not be destroyed,
depending on the speed with which the German forces can reach the
depot. (Note: this kind of event, finding a fuel depot, is not explicitly
incorporated into the model we presented in the previous section. We
treat it as a combat event in which the Germans are always victorious if
they reach the depot before it was historically destroyed.)
We examine only the Northern flank of the German advance: the
attack by the Sixth Panzer army and northernmost divisions of the Fifth
Panzer army, along three main routes. While much of the history of the
Ardennes Campaign has concentrated on the defense of Bastogne on the
southern shoulder, the advance along the southern part of the front had
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no chance at all to reach Antwerp by December 24. Distance, the his-
toric defense of Bastogne, and the unexpectedly rapid reinforcements
from Patton’s Third Army doomed the southern advance, which anyway
was intended only to screen the northern advance from the US Third
Army. We assume that the southern advance succeeded to the point that
no reinforcements could reach the northern flank from the south before
December 24.
The Ardennes campaign was in part a logistics failure because of a
lack of fuel, but as we will show, we estimate it would have had less
than a 50% chance of success even with abundant fuel. Although in the
initial days US forces fought against long odds, over the longer term,
the odds against the Germans were enormous. The Germans had no
chance of holding the territory they were taking, and only a small
chance of achieving their mission and destroying the port at Antwerp.
This case example is only asking whether and by how much fuel sharing
might have increased that chance.
4.2. Opposing forces
Force sizes for the divisions listed below, and their associated ma-
teriel, can be found in Appendix E and F of Dupuy et al. (1994). That
information is incorporated into our model and is summarized in
Table 1.
Below we list the opposing forces on the northern shoulder, at the
division level, at the beginning of the campaign. The list is a general-
ization in several ways. First, on both sides several units from other
divisions were attached (e.g., the US 38th Cavalry Squadron attached to
the 9th Infantry Division), and involved in combat (listed force
strengths include attachments). Second, divisions from the US VII Corps
were held in reserve, and became involved later in the campaign. But
these reserve divisions were deployed based on the events on the
ground, so there is no certainty about how they would have been de-
ployed if events had unfolded differently (dates reserve forces, for both
sides, became engaged are shown in parentheses). And finally, these
divisions come from different Corps and even different Armies, so the
command structure, and coordination between divisions would have
been complicated.
From north to south the ten German divisions engaged on the
northern flank were: the 326th VolksGrenadier (VG: infantry) Division,
the 277th VG Division, the 12th SS Panzer Division, the 12th VG
Division, the 1st SS Panzer Division, the 3rd PanzerGrenadier (PG:
airborne infantry) Division, the 9th SS Panzer Division, the 18th VG
Division, the 62nd VG Division, and the 116th Panzer Division. From
north to south, three US divisions faced this initial assault, the 99th
Infantry Division, the 2nd Infantry Division, and the 106th Infantry
Division. These were reinforced within two days by two additional di-
visions, the 1st Infantry Division and the 30th Infantry Division. By Dec
19, two more divisions, the 9th Infantry and 82nd Airborne, were also
engaged.
As shown in Table 1, the 9th SS Pz was held in reserve until Dec 20.
This may have made sense to German objectives of holding territory or
encircling US forces, but in hindsight, by Dec 20 the 9th SS Pz would be
unable to assist in achieving, or even supporting the original objective
of disabling the port at Antwerp. So, consistent with our assumptions
that German forces remain focused on that sole objective, we assume
the 9th SS Pz was held in reserve only until the other armored divisions
met battle, and then it was launched along the path of least resistance
toward Antwerp.
Three US armored divisions were behind the lines at the beginning
of the campaign, but are incorporated in the simulation. The 2nd, 3rd
and 7th AD (Armored Divisions) reacted to events and met the Germans
where Allied command considered they were most needed.
Representing this situation in a closed simulation is difficult, so we will
incorporate these divisions into the simulation based on the first day
they entered active combat, along routes where they were active. The
7th Armored Division will be deployed as early as Dec 17 on the south
end of the northern flank (against the 116th Pz). The 3rd AD was in
position by December 19, and will be positioned in the middle of the
northern flank (against either the 1st SS or the 9th SS Pz, depending on
simulated events). The 2nd was not brought into action until December
24, at the Meuse River. But if the Germans had achieved the necessary
quick breakthrough across the Meuse, they almost certainly would have
found the 2nd Armored Division waiting for them in front of Antwerp,
so we will position them in front of that city in our simulation, to meet
any German divisions that achieve a breakthrough.
Table 1
Divisions on the northern flank of the Ardennes Campaign (Date of first en-
counter if after Dec 16).
Division Infantry Armament Casualties
[pre Dec 23/total]
Germany Forces
326 VG 9083 9 AT, 79 lAR, 18 mAR 441/1415
277 VG 7249 11 AG, 7 AT, 71 lAR, 17mAR 909/1021
12 SS Pz 20,700 70 T, 57 AG, 20 AC, 137 APC,
42 AT,
1370/3134
37 lAR, 35 mAR, 100 R
12 VG 9517 6 AG, 9 AT, 68 lAR, 14 mAR 1198/3651
1 SS Pz 21,292 97 T, 55 AG, 16 AC, 135 APC,
42
1496/3687
AT, 31 lAR, 33 mAR, 78 R
3 PG 11,424 30 AT, 15 lAR, 10mAR 435/2007
9 SS Pz (20 Dec)
13,307
66 T, 53 AG, 29 AC, 151 APC,
44
492/3533
AT, 37 lAR, 36 mAR
18 VG 12,117 28 AG, 9 AT, 79 lAR, 21 mAR 1320/3110
62 VG 11,050 10 AG, 9 AT, 79 lAR, 19 mAR 1198/3607
116 Pz 15,468 49 T, 25 AG, 18 AC, 123 APC,
29
1068/2898
AT, 23 lAR, 17 mAR
United States Forces
9 ID (19 Dec)
15,520




99 ID 16,480 15 T, 18 AG, 20 AC, 41 APC,
18 AT,
1997/2714
53 lAR, 24 mAR, 8 hAR
3 AD (19 Dec)
15,292
196 T, 197 AG, 97 AC, 687
APC, 32
237/2076
AT, 70 lAR, 12 mAR, 12 hAR
2 ID 17,176 38 T, 22 AG, 44 AC, 47 APC,
36 AT,
1513/1918
78 lAR, 12 mAR, 8 hAR
1 ID (17 Dec)
15,845
50 T, 73 AG, 16 AC, 53 APC, 4
AT,
442/1165
54 lAR, 24 mAR, 4 hAR
30 ID (17 Dec)
17,215
77 T, 48 AG, 18 AC, 106 APC,
32
747/2036
AT, 102 lAR, 12 mAR
7 AD (17 Dec)
11,950




82 AbnD (19 Dec)
11,591
12 AG, 56 lAR, 12 mAR 192/1824




2 AD (23 Dec)
18,351
239 T, 255 AG, 193 AC, 706
APC,
13/1500
72 lAR, 12 mAR
Abbreviations: T=Tank, AT=Anti-Tank, AG=Assault Gun, AC=Armored
Car, APC=Armored Personnel Carrier, lAR= light Artillery (towed and self-
propelled are combined), mAR=medium Artillery, hAR=heavy Artillery,
R=Rocket.




Battles East of the Meuse
Route 1 12 SS Pz, 326VG and 277VG
Route 2 1st SS Pz, 12VG, and 3PG
Route 3 116 Pz, 18VG, 62VG
The 9SSPz joins battle on Dec 19 on the route with the best
odds.
Dec 21–24
Surviving Pz Units move along their routes toward Antwerp
while fuel remains
Dec 24
Pz Divs with sufficient fuel to reach Antwerp join and confront
2AD
4.3. Combat parameters
The Ardennes Campaign has been the subject of considerable
combat modeling effort (Dupuy, et al., 1994; Bracken, 1995; Fricker,
1998), and the Dupuy Institute has developed a well-known Ardennes
Campaign Simulator. Fricker makes a persuasive case that his
Non‐Lanchester model has higher fidelity to the actual outcomes than
the Lanchester and modified Lanchester models that Bracken in-
vestigated. He also notes that Bracken fails to model the significant
impact of air forces in the campaign (Bracken, 1995; Fricker, 1998).
However, we are cutting short our simulation before the air forces can
be brought into play. Our comparison will be a fair one, even if the
combat model we use is not the most accurate model possible. By that
we simply mean that our interest is in demonstrating whether fuel
sharing has a significant impact on the probability of mission success,
and we see no reason why the results should be biased in favor of the
status quo or the transshipments-allowed alternative because of the
combat model selected.
We use a stochastic simulation subroutine provided by Paul Sanchez
(2015) of the Naval Postgraduate School to model combat, which is
based on the Lanchester Model, and uses data drawn from Dupuy, et al.
(1994), with parameters estimated from that data by Bracken (1995).
We will terminate combat with an Absolute Decision Rule (Jaiswal &
Nagabhushana, 1995), again based on the historical data shown in
Table 1. For divisions that retreated or were defeated in combat his-
torically, we will terminate simulated combat when the simulated ca-
sualty rate equals the casualty rate associated with their historical de-
feat. For divisions that were not historically defeated, we will use an
average of the reported historical casualty rates for German and US
forces (respectively – the average casualty rates for defeated German
and US forces were different) to terminate simulated combat.
4.4. Logistics parameters
Our model requires the estimation of several parameters including
the rate of fuel consumption by a division, the amount of fuel in a di-
vision’s initial provision, the rate of forward movement for a foot or
motorized division, and how that rate is reduced by battle.
Estimation of logistics parameters of the Ardennes Campaign has not
received as much scrutiny as combat parameters. The only one of these
factors for which good data exists is the rate of forward movement. Rates
of forward movement for units engaged in the Ardennes campaign are
mentioned in two of the datasets cited by Helmbold (1995): DESANTIS,
and ACSDB. The average rate of movement reported for foot units lightly
engaged (not including heavy combat) is 8.15 km per day (k/d), with a
standard deviation of 0.92 k/d; for motorized units the average rate of
movement when lightly engaged is 13.2 k/d, with a standard deviation of
8.1 k/d. In heavy combat, the rates of advance are much less
(mean=4.0 k/d, std. dev.=3.4 k/d foot; mean=10.4 k/d, std.
Table 2
Distribution of status quo potential outcomes.
At least one German division reaches battle with 2AD across the
Meuse
41.3%
2AD defeated and Antwerp Destroyed 4.5%
Fuel Depot on Spa-Stavelot road reached before being destroyed 5.2%
12SSPzD reaches Antwerp 1.4%
1SSPzD reaches Antwerp 1.7%
9SSPzD reaches Antwerp 12.1%
116PzD reaches Antwerp 16.3%
Only one German division reaches Antwerp 31.5%
9SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 5.0%
1SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 0.5%
12SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 0.7%
12SSPzD and 1SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
12SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.4%
1SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 2.1%
Two German divisions reach Antwerp 8.7%
1SSPzD, 116PzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.8%
1SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
1SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 116SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.2%
9SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 116SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.1%
Three German divisions reach Antwerp 1.1%
All four German Divisions reach Antwerp 0.0%
No German division 
reaches Antwerp 
4% 
One or more German
Divisions reach Antwerp 
and destroys it 
German division reaches 
Antwerp but is defeated 
Fig. 1. Chart indicating the likelihood of reaching Antwerp and succeeding (status quo scenario).
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dev.=8.0 k/d motorized). In our simulation, we will assume forward
movement rates during combat follow a lognormal distribution with
these parameters. In general, we will assume all movement east of the
Meuse River involves at least light engagement. When not engaged in
combat (e.g., from any breakthrough across the Meuse until the 2nd
Armored Division is encountered), we will derive the rate of forward
movement from the ROWLAND dataset reported by (Helmbold, 1995).
That dataset reported maximum rates of advance across uncontested
terrain. The dataset contained several observations from Northwestern
Europe in hilly or snowy terrain. The average maximum rate across those
observations is 111.1 k/d, with a standard deviation of 45.8 k/d.
Given the rates of movement, it is clear that only motorized divi-
sions would have any chance of reaching Antwerp before Dec 24. Based
on data from Cavanagh (2001) and current maps, and rounded to 5 km
increments, the distance to be travelled by the German armored divi-
sions are assigned as follows:
• 12th SS PZ, 190 km• 1st SS PZ, 200 km• 9th SS PZ, 200 km• 116th PZ, 210 km.
We have no data on fuel consumption by the various divisions, but
we have the useful observation that the divisions started the operation
with between 40% and 50% of the fuel they needed to reach their
objective at Antwerp (Cole, 1965). We will assume motorized division
have½ the fuel needed to reach Antwerp, and assume fuel consumption
is proportional to the distance travelled to the objective. After travelling
that distance, German divisions will run out of fuel unless they reach a
fuel depot, conquer an enemy division, or receive a trans-shipment from
another division.
In the status quo, no trans‐shipments are allowed, and divisions
which capture fuel do not share it.
The alternative scenario involves a very limited form of fuel sharing.
In the alternative scenario, viable divisions will only share excess fuel
after they cross the Meuse, and have only one major battle (with the
2nd AD) remaining. They will share only excess fuel not needed to
reach the objective, and they will share it with the nearest still-viable
division. The only other time a unit will share fuel is when it becomes
delayed or disabled to the point that they can no longer reach Antwerp.
They will then share ½ of their remaining fuel with the nearest other
viable division.
The amount of fuel shared is somewhat arbitrary. Given the model’s
objective, a disabled unit should optimally give away all of its fuel to the
unit with (currently) the greatest probability of reaching the objective.
We constrain this to½ the fuel remaining in recognition that a reduced-
and-defeated unit would insist on keeping enough fuel to return to the
jumping off point, or at least to some defensible line.
Fuel sharing in the simulation always incurs a ½ day delay, and has
a probability of 0.10 that it fails because it is interdicted. Again, these
constants are somewhat arbitrary. The delay is meant to model the
difficulty of the terrain, because the roads in the Ardennes are not
amenable to this sort of transshipment. However, we have no good data
on how long such a transshipment would take. After Dec 18, US forces
would have potentially been in a position to try to interdict fuel ship-
ments (because extant US forces were in place behind German lines).
Such forces would have been scattered by the offensive, but potentially
capable of destroying a lightly-defended fuel shipment. But again, we
have no good data on how likely that interdiction would be to succeed,
since no such fuel shipments were historically undertaken.
So, referring back to the model and pseudo-code provided in Section
3, the three decisions in the model are greatly simplified in this nu-
merical example, but two ‘events’ unique to this case example have
been added. The selection of combat units and route selection process is
limited to the historical choices made by the Germans, except for the
Table 3
Distribution of outcomes with trans‐shipments of fuel allowed.
At least one German division reaches battle with 2AD across the
Meuse
52.1%
2AD defeated and Antwerp Destroyed 29.4%
Fuel Depot on Spa-Stavelot road reached before being destroyed 4.3%
12SSPzD reaches Antwerp 1.9%
1SSPzD reaches Antwerp 3.1%
9SSPzD reaches Antwerp 3.4%
116PzD reaches Antwerp 13.3%
Only one German division reaches Antwerp 21.6%
9SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 1.1%
1SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 1.2%
12SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 0.2%
12SSPzD and 1SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
12SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
1SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 21.0%
Two German divisions reach Antwerp 23.5%
1SSPzD, 116PzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 6.2%
1SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.7%
1SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 116SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
9SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 116SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
Three German divisions reach Antwerp 6.9%
All four German Divisions reach Antwerp 0.0%
No German division 
reaches Antwerp 
One or more German
divisions reach Antwerp 
and destroys it 
German division reaches 
Antwerp but is defeated 
Fig. 2. Chart indicating the likelihood of reaching Antwerp and succeeding (shared fuel scenario).
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9th SS Pz which was held in reserve. The 9th SS Pz is launched on at the
beginning of day 2 as a separate event, and the route selected is the one
that has the least resistance in route to Antwerp. The transshipment
model is as described in the previous section: transshipments are made
when a unit is defeated, or when it crosses the Meuse (this crossing, and
the Spa-Stavelot depot, are events unique to this case example, added to
the simulation described in Section 3). The transshipment amount is
either the unneeded excess (for a unit that has achieved a breakthrough
across the Meuse) or ½ of its remaining fuel (for a unit that has been
defeated).
4.5. Calibration to historical data and results
All our simulation results are based on simulation runs with 8000
iterations. This run size was selected based on trial runs to provide a
95% confidence interval of smaller than 0.1% in the primary result, the
overall probability of defeating the 2nd AD and entering Antwerp.
Repeated runs were made with 8000 iterations to verify stability in the
outcomes.
First, we ran our simulation model to try to replicate the outcomes
of the actual event, with no fuel transshipments allowed. Since our
primary outcome is a probability of success, a clear target for calibra-
tion is difficult to find. However, all historical accounts seem to take
two things for granted. First, that substantial damage was going to be
done to front line US divisions (99th Infantry, 2nd Infantry and 106th
Infantry) on December 16 and 17. In the actual event, the 106th
Infantry virtually disintegrated, suffering 1267 battle casualties, and
over 7000 missing in action. But the second thing all sources agree upon
is that ultimately the Germans had little or no chance to enter Antwerp.
In the event, as mentioned, no division even made it halfway.
Results are shown in Table 2, illustrated in Fig. 1. As far as damage
to the initial divisions, the combat model predicts the 99th, 2nd and
106th Infantry divisions are defeated (reach a critical number of ca-
sualties) in every one of the 8000 iterations. As far as ultimate outcome
however, the probability of German success in the status quo is pre-
dicted to be only 4.5%. The results show that at least one German di-
vision crosses the Meuse, and does battle with the US 2nd AD 31.5% of
the time. However, using standard weights for armor and artillery, the
2nd AD is the largest division represented in this simulation: no single
German division reaching it ever defeats it alone. Indeed, even when
two German Panzer divisions reach it, they succeed in defeating it less
than 50% of the time. This is in part because the German divisions are
already reduced by earlier battles to reach the Meuse, but also because
the 2nd AD is so much larger.
We can now examine the impact of the two counterfactual as-
sumptions we made regarding the 9th SS Pz and the 116th Pz. What
actually happened in the battle was that the 9th SS Pz started too late to
be able to reach Antwerp in time, and the 106th Pz was drawn south to
Bastogne, out of the push for Antwerp. Without the 9th SS Pz and the
116th Pz, the probability of success would rely entirely on the 1st SS Pz
and the 12th SS Pz: and those two divisions almost never reach the
battle at Antwerp together (see Table 2). Since the 2nd AD can only be
defeated if two division engage it, the probability of German success
virtually disappears (less than 0.2%) when the 9th SS Pz and 116th Pz
are not engaged in the push to Antwerp (agreeing with sources that in
the real event, without our counterfactual assumptions, the Germans
had little or no chance to enter Antwerp).
Having obtained this level of calibration, we wanted to test to see
whether fuel sharing could improve the probability of German success.
As explained above, we allowed only a limited form of transshipments
in the alternative solution, and each trans-shipment comes with a
penalty of time, as well as a risk of being interdicted. Trans-shipments
will be useful to the extent there is variance in which divisions are able
to advance (so that blocked units can flexibly provide supply to those
Table 4
Distribution of outcomes when Germans start with adequate fuel.
At least one German division reaches battle with 2AD across the
Meuse
74.3%
2AD defeated and Antwerp destroyed 34.3%
Fuel Depot on Spa-Stavelot road reached before being destroyed 4.9%
12SSPzD reaches Antwerp 8.6%
1SSPzD reaches Antwerp 0.6%
9SSPzD reaches Antwerp 4.6%
116PzD reaches Antwerp 12.0%
Only one German division reaches Antwerp 25.7%
9SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 1.8%
1SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 0.2%
12SSPzD and 116PzD reach Antwerp 12.6%
12SSPzD and 1SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
12SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.2%
1SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 4.5%
Two German divisions reach Antwerp 19.3%
1SSPzD, 116PzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 6.8%
1SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 9SSPzD reach Antwerp 8.8%
1SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 116SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.1%
9SSPzD, 12SSPzD and 116SSPzD reach Antwerp 0.0%
Three German divisions reach Antwerp 15.7%
All four German Divisions reach Antwerp 13.6%
No German division 
reaches Antwerp 
One or more German
divisions reach Antwerp 
and destroys it 
German division reaches 
Antwerp but is defeated 
Fig. 3. Chart indicating the likelihood of reaching Antwerp and succeeding (adequate fuel scenario).
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which are able to advance) and to the extent that the problem is fuel,
and not combat effectiveness, or time. In other words, more fuel will
allow the German units to advance further, but this will not help if they
are only advancing to be beaten by the 2nd AD, nor will it help if they
are unable to advance quickly enough to reach their target before
December 24.
Results are shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Fig. 2. As shown, the
probability the 2nd AD is defeated and the Germans enter Antwerp rises
to 29.4% if fuel sharing is allowed. This is primarily because of fuel
sharing between the 1st SS Pz and the 9th SS Pz. Indeed, the simulation
shows the counter‐intuitive result that the two divisions are more likely
to cross the Meuse together than they are individually. This is possible,
of course, because the events are no longer independent. With fuel
sharing, one division has sometimes scavenged enough fuel (from the
Stave‐Spa depot, or elsewhere) to allow both divisions to reach An-
twerp. And with our assumption that the 9th SS Pz moves a day earlier
than it did in the actual event, it reaches the battle with the 82nd
Airborne and the 3rd AD in time to assist the 1st SS Pz, and usually they
will either both be defeated, or both survive that battle. Since the 9th SS
Pz is often relatively unscathed by earlier battles, fuel sharing from the
1st SS Pz substantially increases the probability it can reach the battle
with the 2nd AD, and that substantially increases the probability the
2nd AD can be defeated.
Finally, we wanted to examine the extent to which the Ardennes
campaign was a logistics defeat. That is, to what extent was the German
ability to reach Antwerp before December 24 limited by their combat
capabilities, and to what extent was it limited by their lack of fuel? To
answer this question, we re-ran the initial simulation (without trans-
shipments) setting the initial fuel level high enough so that all divisions
could reach Antwerp.
Results are shown in Table 4 and illustrated in Fig. 3. The prob-
ability of German success rises to 34.3% if they have sufficient fuel for
each division, compared to the status quo probability of success of
4.5%. This shows that the fuel sharing strategy recaptures (29.4–4.5)/
(34.3–4.5)= 83.6% of the disadvantage incurred by the German lack of
fuel.
5. Summary, conclusions and extensions
This paper has examined the role of logistics in supporting isolated
expeditions. We have developed a model in which the probability of
success of an expeditionary mission may be increased by allowing fuel
sharing between expeditionary units, and transshipping supplies be-
tween them if needed. We developed a numerical, historical example
Map. Courtesy of the United States Military Academy Department of History. Downloaded from http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/ardennes_dec_1944.
htm. The map shows Allied forces on Dec 25th, and the furthest penetration of seven German Panzer Divisions (PD) on or before Dec 25. From North to South: 1SS
(ISS), 9SS, 12SS, 2SS, 116, 2 and 9. The 9SS and 2SS were reserve divisions. The 2SS was launched too late to ever reach Antwerp (Antwerp is due north of Brussels,
along the Albert Canal, under the key in the upper left corner). The 2 and 9 Panzer divisions in the south were intended as a defensive screen against the US 3rd Army,
but became bogged down at Bastogne.
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based on the Ardennes Campaign of December 1944. Results showed
that fuel transshipments could have significantly increased the prob-
ability of mission success. More generally, we think results indicate that
post-supply chain expeditionary operations still rely critically on lo-
gistics decision-making for success.
One limitation of this paper is that it has examined the con-
sequences of fuel sharing in expeditionary logistics, but not the methods
of accomplishing it. Risk-minimizing routing has been studied before
(Bae, Kim & Han, 2015) and of course, evolving technology has been
applied to help find safe routes in contested areas for military vehicles
(Buyurgan & Lehlou, 2015). That modeling could be applied to the
problem of reducing the risk of expeditionary transshipments.
New technologies for renewable power generation, portable water
purification, and autonomous resupply vehicles can provide a sig-
nificant advance in self-sufficiency. But improved logistics tactics are
necessary to make these technologies most effective, by providing a
framework for sharing such resources. More work is needed to develop
better logistics strategies and tactics, to improve support of expedi-
tionary operations. We think the risk framework developed in this
paper can be useful in assessing the efficacy of those strategies and
tactics as they evolve.
Our example is a proof-of-concept. More work is needed to examine
the situations in which transshipments are most effective in expedi-
tionary operations. More work is also needed to develop other post-
supply chain logistics decisions: for example, when it is most important
to embed maintenance capabilities with forward deployed units.
Modern technologies, such as semi-autonomous logistics vehicles create
possibilities for transshipments (or re-routing) of supplies based on
evolving operational conditions. This research is an initial step in that
direction.
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